Northwest Indiana Discussion

Judge throws out Rias verdict
By Susan Brown Posted: Friday, January 22, 2010

CROWN POINT | Lake Criminal Court Judge Thomas Stefaniak Jr. has set aside a December jury verdict that found 19-year-old Anthony Rias II guilty of murder in the perpetration of a robbery.

Rias, a Gary resident, had been charged with murder, robbery, and murder in the perpetration of robbery for allegedly orchestrating the murder/robbery that was carried out by three co-defendants.

Stefaniask ruled in favor of a defense motion that had argued the jury had rendered an inconsistent verdict in finding Rias guilty of the murder/robbery charge, but not guilty of the robbery charge.

Arguments were heard on the defense motion, filed Jan. 11, prior to what would have been Rias' sentencing hearing in which he faced the potential of a 65-year sentence in the 2007 execution-style shooting/robbery of Dominique Keesee, 19, of East Chicago.

Anticipating charges to be re-filed, Stefaniak set a new trial date of April 5.

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Lake County prosecutors ought to appeal this ruling, if for nothing else, simply to clarify the status of Indiana law. Consider the following:

In Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), this Court held that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count could not attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on another count.

"Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment. Latham v. The Queen, 5 Best & Smith 635, 642, 643. Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262 [18 S.Ct. 580, 42 L.Ed. 1029]. If separate indictments had been presented against the defendant for possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and had been separately tried, the same evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal on one could not be pleaded as res judicata of the other. Where the offenses are separately charged in the counts of a single indictment the same rule must hold. As was said in Steckler v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 59, 60 [ (2nd Cir.):

" 'The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. Dunn, 284 U.S., at 393, 52 S.Ct., at 190.

Inconsistent verdicts therefore present a situation where "error," in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored. Given this uncertainty, and the fact that the Government is precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a new trial on the conviction as a matter of course. Harris v. Rivera, supra, indicates that nothing in the Constitution would require such a protection, and we therefore address the problem only under our supervisory powers over the federal criminal process. For us, the possibility that the inconsistent verdicts may favor the criminal defendant as well as the Government militates against review of such convictions at the defendant's behest. This possibility is a premise of Dunn § alternative rationale—that such inconsistencies often are a product of jury lenity. Thus, Dunn has been explained by both courts and commentators as a recognition of the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch. See, e.g., United States v. May bury, 274 F.2d 899, 902 (CA2 1960) (Friendly, J.); Bickel, Judge and Jury—Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 649, 652 (1950). Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-156, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1450-1451, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).

Finally, we note that a criminal defendant already is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts. This review should not be confused with the problems caused by inconsistent verdicts. Sufficiency-of-the evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 29(a); cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). This review should be independent of the jury's determination that evidence on another count was insufficient. The Government must convince the jury with its proof, and must also satisfy the courts that given this proof the jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not believe that further safeguards against jury irrationality are necessary.

Respondent contends, nevertheless, that an exception to the Dunn rule should be made where the jury acquits a defendant of a predicate felony, but convicts on the compound felony. Such an "exception" falls almost of its own weight. First, the acceptability of this exception is belied by the facts of Dunn itself. In Dunn, the defendant was acquitted of unlawful possession, and unlawful sale, of liquor, but was convicted of maintaining a nuisance by keeping unlawful liquor for sale at a specified place. The same evidence was adduced for all three counts, and Justice Butler's dissent persuasively points out that the jury could not have convicted on the nuisance count without finding that the defendant possessed, or sold, intoxicating liquor. Dunn, 284 U.S., at 398, 52 S.Ct., at 192. Respondent's exception therefore threatens to swallow the rule.
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Second, respondent's argument that an acquittal on a predicate offense necessitates a finding of insufficient evidence on a compound felony count simply misunderstands the nature of the inconsistent verdict problem. Whether presented as an insufficient evidence argument, or as an argument that the acquittal on the predicate offense should collaterally estop the Government on the compound offense, the argument necessarily assumes that the acquittal on the predicate offense was proper—the one the jury "really meant." This, of course, is not necessarily correct; all we know is that the verdicts are inconsistent. The Government could just as easily—and erroneously—argue that since the jury convicted on the compound offense the evidence on the predicate offense must have been sufficient. The problem is that the same jury reached inconsistent results; once that is established principles of collateral estoppel—which are predicated on the assumption that the jury acted rationally and found certain facts in reaching its verdict—are no longer useful.

This problem is not altered when the trial judge instructs the jury that it must find the defendant guilty of the predicate offense to convict on the compound offense. Although such an instruction might indicate that the counts are no longer independent, if inconsistent verdicts are nevertheless reached those verdicts still are likely to be the result of mistake, or lenity, and therefore are subject to the Dunn rationale. Given this impasse, the factors detailed above—the Government's inability to invoke review, the general reluctance to inquire into the workings of the jury, and the possible exercise of lenity—suggest that the best course to take is simply to insulate jury verdicts from review on this ground.

Maybe the jury figured he was too busy murdering the victim to pick up anything worth stealing - that's what his buddies were there for.

Judge: I was 'plain wrong,' reverses self

February 16, 2010

BY RUTH ANN KRAUSE, POST-TRIBUNE CORRESPONDENT

Lake Superior Court Judge Thomas Stefaniak Jr., who last month set aside verdicts in the Anthony Rias II felony murder case and set a new trial, changed his mind Monday.

"As I sit here now, I believe I was just plain wrong," Stefaniak said of his decision Jan. 22 to order a new trial for Rias after the jury convicted the 20-year-old Gary man of murder in perpetration of a robbery but acquitted him of separate murder and robbery charges.

Rias was convicted in the murder of Dominique Keesee, 19, of East Chicago, who was shot about 15 times on Nov. 16, 2007, during a robbery at his East Chicago home.

Stefaniak said there was credible evidence in the record to support deputy prosecutor Michelle Jatkiewicz's contention that Rias didn't share in the marijuana, clothes and game system taken in the robbery but took a substantial step in carrying out that crime. Because he didn't receive any of the items taken, the jury could have concluded Rias wasn't guilty of the robbery.

Rias was charged with killing Keesee while committing or attempting to commit robbery. Evidence showed Rias was involved in planning the crime but wasn't one of the individuals who shot Keesee during the robbery, which was carried out by three co-defendants.

Last month, defense attorney Arlington Foley filed a motion seeking a judgment of acquittal based on evidence. Foley argued the verdicts were inconsistent with each other and asked that his client be found not guilty. Stefaniak, however, decided to set aside the verdicts and order a new trial.

On Monday, the judge reversed that decision and scheduled a March 3 sentencing hearing.

Rias faces a maximum 65-year term.